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Abstract: 
Demand forecasting to support supply chain planning is a critical activity, recognized as 
pivotal in manufacturing and retailing operations where information is shared across 
functional areas to produce final detailed forecasts. The approach generally encountered is 
that a baseline statistical forecast is examined in the light of shared information from sales, 
marketing and logistics and the statistical forecast may then be modified to take these various 
pieces of information into account.  This experimental study explores forecasters’ use of 
available information when they are faced with the task of adjusting a baseline forecast for a 
number of retail stock keeping units to take into account a forthcoming promotion. 
Forecasting demand in advance of promotions carries a particular significance given their 
intensive supply chain repercussions and financial impact.  Both statistical and qualitative 
information was provided through a forecasting support system typical of those found in 
practice. Our results show participants responding to the quantity of information made 
available, though with decreasing scale effects. In addition, various statistical cues (which are 
themselves extraneous) were illustrated to be particularly important, including the size and 
timing of the last observed promotion.  Overall, participants appeared to use a compensatory 
strategy when combining information that had either positive or negative implications for the 
success of the promotions. However, there was a consistent bias towards underestimating the 
effect of the  promotions. These observed biases have important implications for the design 
of organizational sales and operations planning processes and the forecasting support systems 
that such processes rely on.  
 
Key Words; Demand planning; Sales and Operations Planning; Behavioural operations; 
Forecasting support systems; Promotional planning; Information effects. 
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Information use in supply chain forecasting 
 
1. Introduction 
Forecasts lie at the heart of supply chain operations: production and inventory planning and 
scheduling, logistics, marketing and finance all rely on short-term disaggregate forecasts at 
SKU level. Yet little research has been carried out into the way such forecasts are actually 
produced and the factors that influence their effectiveness (Seifert et al, 2015;  Thomé et al., 
2012; Tuomikangas and Kaipia, 2014). In contrast to the academic research literature, the 
practitioner literature is awash with descriptions and recommendations as to how ‘Sales and 
Operations Planning (S&OP)’ processes can be used to effectively integrate cross-functional 
information to produce forecasts, for example, Lapide ( 2007) and Stahl (2010). To address 
this research gap in part, the aim of this paper is to identify how forecasters respond to 
information that reflects the various countervailing events and trends that are expected to 
influence sales. The approach adopted  involves a number of experiments in a realistic 
simulation of the supply chain forecaster’s task environment. 
 
The forecasts within S&OP are usually produced as a combination of a simple statistical 
forecast and judgment (Fildes and Goodwin 2007). The most common approach is where an 
initial statistical forecast is adjusted judgmentally. After the statistical forecast is produced 
(based on the SKU time series history for established products), the forecaster may receive 
information from other functional areas such as marketing and may adjust the statistical 
forecast to reflect this additional information.  These judgmentally adjusted forecasts are then 
adopted as final forecasts across the supply chain. Moon et al. (2003) argue that the 
functional integration that is involved in the production of these forecasts is an important 
element of effective forecasting.   However, in one of the few detailed case studies of 
forecasting practice, Goodwin et al. (2007) found that the overall benefits of the additional 
information were slight and often negative, when they observed a highly formalised 
procedure in a pharmaceutical company for adjusting the initial statistical forecast based on 
regularly scheduled meetings. Oliva and Watson (2011),  in a case study of a consumer 
electronics manufacturer, also focused on processes for information sharing across functional 
areas and the harmful effects of what Moon (Moon, et al., 2003) have called functional silos, 
where there are  disincentives for  the different functions to be aligned. The careful design of 
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the S&OP process, Oliva and Watson (2011) argue, can lead to effective forecasting. But this 
claim is based on limited evidence as to both the statistical features of the forecasting process 
they describe as well as how benefits accrue from better integration of information. A second 
route to developing insights into the benefits of such additional information can be gained 
through cross-sectional survey evidence, comparisons of statistical forecasts with the final 
forecasts after judgmental adjustment and the impact of information use. However, deriving 
conclusions from these surveys is not straightforward given the tricky interactions between 
use of different information sources and the forecasting performance metrics that are 
dependent on organizational processes (Danese and Kalchschmidt 2011a, 2011b). 
 
While the detailed case studies provide insight into the processes by which information is 
combined, they have told us little about the statistical characteristics of supply chain forecasts 
and whether there is any potential for significant improvement. This aspect of the use of 
information has recently been examined by Fildes et al. (2009) and Franses and Legerstree 
(2010, 2011, 2013) who between them have analysed over 100,000 forecasts from a number 
of companies. By contrasting the revealed sales, the initial statistical forecast and the final 
adjusted forecast, various hypotheses have been explored including whether the forecasts are 
biased and what determines forecast error. Overall, the results suggest that the information 
that is brought to bear in the production of the final forecast is not used rationally or 
efficiently (Fildes et al. 2009), that the experts place excessive weight on their own judgment 
(Franses and Legerstee 2010, 2013), and that the resulting adjusted forecasts are biased 
(Fildes et al, 2009). Also, negative information leading to downward adjustments of the 
statistical forecast is weighted differently from positive information, and this leads to 
downward adjustments having greater value (Fildes et al. 2009).  Furthermore, lower 
accuracy of expert-adjusted forecasts (as compared to model-based forecasts) appears to 
persist across various forecast horizons (Franses and Legerstee 2011).   
 
But what is the information that is being used when the judgmental adjustments are being 
made? In a survey of primarily supply chain forecasters (Fildes and Goodwin 2007), the key 
pieces of information concerned the effects of marketing activities in particular promotions, 
together with the effects of advertising and price changes. Supply limitations were seen as 
important whilst holiday and weather effects were also listed by around 20% of respondents.  
Changes in government policy and regulation also influenced the adjustments forecasters 
made. Trapero et al. (2013) have gone some way to understanding how promotional 
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information is used. Using data on promotions as well as forecasts and sales from a 
household product manufacturer, they showed that important promotional information 
leading to large-scale adjustments had extremely deleterious effects on forecast accuracy. In 
essence, the forecasters misinterpreted the positive information in their possession. 
 
From the case studies of the S&OP process and the statistical modelling we have just 
described, various aspects of the task of forecast production have proved important; in 
particular, the integration of different types of information including both the time series 
history and statistical forecasts supplemented by descriptive information, along with the 
context in which the information is used including the forecaster’s characteristics and 
motivation. The consequences of how the information is processed are observed biases and 
inefficiencies in forecasting accuracy. In this paper we take an experimental approach, 
effectively completing the methodological triangulation. The aim is to understand in a 
controlled setting the differential effects of the time series cues, and the descriptive 
information, both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’, that an S&OP process typically delivers.  In particular, 
we will focus on how forecasters handle information of different types from a range of 
different sources.  
 
The paper is in five further sections. The next section discusses what the literature can tell us 
about how forecasters use and combine time series and contextual information to produce 
judgmental estimates and any effects of their different motivations and understanding when 
engaging with this process. This leads us to a set of hypotheses. Section 3 considers our 
methodology, including the contribution experimental research makes to the study of supply 
chain forecasting, the participants and  the experimental setting. The fourth section contains 
the results and Section 5 provides a discussion of our findings.  Finally, Section 6 
summarizes our conclusions as well as providing suggestions for further work. 
 
2. The use of information in supply chain forecasting 
Accurate forecasts are critical for effective performance of supply chain systems.  Although 
previous work has acknowledged the importance of an expanded information set (Fildes and 
Hastings 1994), information sharing (Lee, So and Tang  2014, Önkal and Aktas, 2011, Yu, 
Yan and Cheng, 2001) and collaborative forecasting across organisations (Aviv 2001, Eksoz 
et al. 2014) in order to enhance supply chain performance, there appears to be surprisingly 
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little empirical work on the actual use of information in supply chain forecasting.  In 
attempting to fill this research gap, the current study examines four factors that may 
constitute barriers to the effective  use of information in supply chain forecasting:   (i) biases 
associated with the use of time series information, (ii) the cognitive challenges of making an 
assessment of the aggregate effects of multiple items of contextual information that may be 
presented in a qualitative or narrative form, (iii)  the challenge of combining time series 
information, a statistical forecast  and contextual information, and  (iv) the motivations and 
prior understanding of the forecaster. 
 
2.1 Heuristics and biases associated with the use of time series information 
Forecasts can be systematically biased even when forecasters have the relatively simple task 
of basing their estimates only on time series information (Lawrence et al. 2006).  When time 
series are subject to noise, forecasters have a tendency to implicitly perceive autocorrelation 
in series which have independent observations and to add noise to their forecasts so that they 
appear to be representative of past observations (Reimers & Harvey 2011).  These effects 
may be intensified the higher the level of noise. Related to this is a tendency to pay too much 
attention to the latest observation in a series. As a result, for untrended series, or series with 
high serial dependence, the forecast tends to be a weighted average of the latest observation 
and the long term mean of the series (Harvey et al. 1994). When a trend is present, and serial 
correlation (after removal of the trend) is low, people tend to forecast by adding a proportion 
of the last difference in the series to the last observation (Bolger and Harvey 1993).  
 
When the effects of past special events are contained in the time series and a forecast needs to 
be made for a period when such an event is expected, Goodwin and Fildes (1999) found 
evidence that forecasters used a pattern matching strategy (Hoch and Schkade 1996). This 
involved searching for the past special event  that was most similar to the  forthcoming event 
and using the actual sales for this past event as the basis for  the forecast (as a match with 
actual sales rather than the uplift from a baseline forecast).  This is analogous to the standard 
approach used in industry for forecasting sales in promotion periods, though here the most 
recent promotion is the one that is usually judged to be most similar to the forthcoming 
promotion (Cooper et al. 1999). Given the prevalence of a recency bias in judgmental 
forecasting it seems likely that the proximity of a past event (such as the latest promotion) to 
the current period will increase the salience of the effects of that event and hence its influence 
6 
 
on the forecast.  A recency bias is often associated with a reduced ability to recall older 
information from memory, but the over-attention that is paid to the latest observation when a 
time series is presented suggests that it may also apply when all available information is 
simultaneously presented. 
 
The Goodwin and Fildes (1999) study found that pattern matching was not evident under 
conditions of high noise where the effects of past special events were submerged in the 
random movements of  series. Nevertheless, even if pattern matching is not used the greater 
volatility of high noise series may suggest that a wider range of outcomes is possible so that 
the extreme values associated with special events may be seen as more plausible.  
   
2.2 The effect of providing a statistical time series forecast 
In companies it is common for statistical time-series methods, such as exponential 
smoothing, to be used to provide baseline forecasts of sales (i.e. forecast of sales before the 
effects of special event are considered).  These are typically provided through a Forecasting 
Support System (Fildes et al. 2006). But how are statistical forecasts used when it is known 
that a special event will produce effects that the statistical methods have not taken into 
account? In the study by Goodwin and Fildes (1999) when sales were subject to promotion 
effects the forecasters appeared to ignore the statistical forecast completely, possibly because 
they perceived that the regular underlying time series pattern was suspended in promotion 
periods. However, much may depend on the way the judgmental inputs are elicited. In the 
Goodwin and Fildes study, participants were simply told of the statistical baseline forecast  
and asked to enter their own forecast.  An invitation to adjust the statistical forecast seems 
more likely to focus attention on it.  Thus the interplay between the influence of the statistical 
forecast, the latest observation and the most recent promotion is likely to be crucial.  There 
appear to be two main possibilities: 
 
1. The statistical forecast will be judgmentally adjusted to match the sales achieved in the 
previous promotion and the last observation will be ignored. If this is the case larger 
statistical forecasts will be associated with smaller adjustments, as they will be closer to 
the sales achieved in the previous promotion, and the last observation will not be 
associated with the size of the adjustment. 
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2. The judgmental adjustment will be performed as in (1), but an additional upwards 
adjustment will be made to reflect the last observation as it might be seen as reflecting  a 
recent change in the baseline level of sales (e.g. a recent increase in the popularity of a 
product). This suggests that the forecaster would attempt to match the previous 
promotion and then add or subtract from this depending on whether the previous 
observation is relatively high or low.  If this is the case, larger statistical forecasts will 
be associated with smaller adjustments, as before, but the higher the last observation the 
higher will be the upwards adjustment. 
 
Given the attention that forecasters tend to pay to the latest observation, (2) would appear to 
be more likely with both the latest observation and the previous promotion’s sales potentially 
used as double anchors.  
 
In summary, it appears that where a forecaster is asked to adjust a statistical baseline forecast 
of sales to take into account an imminent sales promotion, the resulting final forecast is likely 
to fall between the statistical forecast and the sales achieved in the previous promotion. This 
means that the closer the baseline forecast is to the previous promotion’s sales, the lower will 
be the adjustment that is perceived to be necessary. However, three other factors seem likely 
to lead to larger upwards adjustments.  First, the influence of the previous promotion is likely 
to be greater if it is more recent as it may then be seen to be more relevant.  Second, the 
higher the last observation in the time series, the greater will be the adjustment. Third, a high 
or low observation in the most recent period is likely to be more salient when it lies well 
above or below the plot of the statistical forecast for that period on a graph. Thus, a large 
positive forecast error in the last period is likely to increase the upwards adjustment made for 
the latest observation and the opposite may be true of a large negative error. Finally, higher 
levels of noise in the series may have conflicting effects on the size of adjustment. High noise 
will tend to mask the effects of the earlier promotion but the greater variation of the past time 
series values will provide support for the belief that high sales are  possible. These arguments 
lead to the following hypotheses. 
 
H1: Larger sales achieved in the previous promotion will be associated with larger upwards 
adjustments. 
H2:  The closer the timing of the previous promotion to the current period the larger the 
adjustment will be. 
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H3: The higher the last observation the higher will be the adjustment. 
 
H4: Statistical forecasting errors for the most recent period will be positively associated with 
judgmental adjustments. 
 
H5: Larger statistical baseline forecasts will be associated with smaller adjustments. 
 
H6: Levels of noise in a series will not be associated with the size of upwards adjustments. 
 
2.3  Assessing the implications of multiple items of contextual information 
The ways in which people make assessments of the effects of multiple items of contextual 
information, or cues, has been the subject of  much research by psychologists (e.g. see 
Karelaia & Hogarth 2008). However, the cues have usually been presented as numeric 
values, rather than the verbal arguments or narratives which are commonly presented during 
the S&OP process to supply chain forecasters.  How is a forecaster likely to react when faced 
with a set of multiple statements, some of which will be positive in relation to the expected 
promotional effect and some of which will be negative?  
 
To produce an adjustment to a statistical forecast, ideally, s/he would assess the reliability 
and relevance of the information in each statement, filtering out any information that is 
judged not to be sufficiently reliable or relevant. The forecaster should then assess each 
statement’s likely implications for sales before finally aggregating these estimated effects, 
together with any estimated interactive effects.  However, assessing reliability and the 
implications of the different statements may be hindered by a sparsity of past cases.  For 
example, promotion campaigns may be relatively rare so a forecaster will have few 
opportunities to assess the extent to which particular factors will be associated with different 
levels of sales uplift.  In addition, before considering the specific features of an event such as 
a promotion, forecasters  may have a prior view of  its likely impact that may be based on 
their recall (which may be imperfect)  of  earlier promotions (Reimers and Harvey 2011), or 
on industry beliefs. Thus there is likely to be a tension between the prior estimate, and the 
assessment of the implications of the specific pieces of available information relating to a 
forthcoming promotion. Anchoring on the effects of an earlier promotion or a prior view 
would suggest that the latest information will be underweighted, but  Kahneman and 
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Lovallo’s (1993) notion of the ‘inside view’ would also suggest that attention will be devoted 
to the specifics of the particular circumstance being studied. 
 
When it comes to aggregating the effects implied by the different statements,  research in 
other domains, such as multiattribute decision making, suggests that forecasters may employ 
either compensatory or non-compensatory strategies (Payne et al. 1993). In a compensatory 
strategy the effects of the full set of available statements are considered and the implications 
of reasons pointing to low sales counted against the implications of those favouring high 
sales. In principle, the aggregation may involve a weighted sum strategy where the estimated 
effects are weighted depending on the reliability, and relative importance of the underlying 
arguments.  There is some evidence that, in general, negative information is perceived to be 
more potent and more salient than positive information. When combinations of positive and 
negative information are provided, the holistic perception is more negative than the aggregate 
of the evaluations of the individual pieces of information (Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Rozin 
& Royzman 2001). However, attaching differential weights to items of information is 
cognitively demanding and it seems possible that forecasters will an equal weight strategy 
(e.g. Dawes 1979). Indeed, when faced with  multiple items of information it seems most 
likely that supply-chain forecasters will seek to minimize the cognitive demands placed on 
them by adopting a non-compensatory strategy. At its simplest, this may involve basing their 
judgment on a single statement – for example, the one which is the most salient (such as a 
negative statement) or is judged to be the most important or reliable – while ignoring the 
others. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
H7: Given the cognitive demands placed on them, forecasters will adopt a non-compensatory 
strategy when considering the estimated effects of multiple items of contextual information. 
 
H8: Negative information will have a greater influence on forecast adjustments than positive 
information. 
2.4   Combining time series information, a statistical forecast and 
contextual information 
 
The human mind has limited information processing capacity (Hogarth, 1987) and when 
large amounts of information from different sources needs to be integrated using judgment,  it 
seems unlikely that the information will be combined efficiently (Leitner & Leopold-
Wildburger, 2011).  In particular, problems may occur when there is a mixture of statistical 
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base-rate data and contextual information. Information presented verbally in the form of 
anecdotes, stories or scenarios may attract more attention than the relatively dull numeric 
statistical forecast or past time series data (Önkal, Sayım, and Gönül 2013).   For example, in 
a classic study Tversky and Kahneman (1974) showed that information on statistical base 
rates is often neglected or discounted even when unreliable narrative information is supplied 
to people making judgments. Hence we hypothesize: 
 
H9: Statistical base-rate information on the average uplift achieved by promotions will tend 
to be neglected. 
 
 
 
2.5 The effects of prior understanding and motivation on information use 
The motivation of the forecaster is also likely to affect the way in which sets of information 
in verbal statements will be assessed and aggregated in forecasting (Eroglu and Croxton 
2010).  In some situations forecasters may prefer the variable-to-be-forecast to take on high 
or low values (e.g. a desire for high sales).  Such desirability of outcomes may lead to an 
overblown optimism (referred to as ‘desirability bias’), potentially influencing the relevant 
predictions (McGregor 1938, Olsen 1997; Windschitl et al. 2010).    
 
Valence priming and differential scrutiny are two mechanisms that may be associated with 
inducing optimistic forecasts Krizan and Windschitl (2007). In valence priming, an event that 
is intrinsically attractive, like high sales, activates attention to positive factors that are 
consistent with the desirable event. For example, attention may be directed to factors such as 
an enthusiastic reaction to a product’s packaging by focus groups, rather than the news that a 
rival is launching a competing product. Differential scrutiny applies when evidence in favour 
of the desired outcome is accepted at a lower quality threshold. Evidence against the desired 
outcome is more carefully scrutinised so that weaknesses in this evidence are more likely to 
be uncovered. In contrast to these mechanisms, negativity bias can make people more 
pessimistic because the desire for a positive outcome actually makes negative information 
more salient.   
 
Despite these potential biases forecasters in many organisations are also likely to be 
motivated to produce accurate forecasts. Indeed, supply chain forecasters identified accuracy 
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as their most important objective in the survey by Fildes and Goodwin (2007); so  aiming for 
accuracy may lead to a more thorough assessment of available information, increasing the 
chances that a compensatory strategy will be employed (Kunda 1990). Moreover, prestige 
concerns and/or the knowledge that one’s forecast will be evaluated may lead to a ‘reality 
constraint’ so that factors favouring optimism bias, for example, may be tempered.  However, 
when large adjustments are required, accuracy rewards may lead to risk averse behaviour and 
insufficient adjustment. Errors, and associated losses in rewards, resulting from wrongly 
making a large adjustment (i.e. an act of commission) may be regarded as worse than those 
resulting from failure to make a large adjustment (an act of omission) (e.g. see Ritov  and 
Baron 1992).  
 
In addition to motivational influences, forecasters all come to the task with relevant past 
experience which may affect the weightings they give to the different pieces of information 
they are presented with, whether in a real S&OP process or a simulated process. Individual 
forecasters typically face the task of forecasting hundreds of products (Fildes et al. 2009) so 
that their experience of the accuracy and reliability of the statistical forecasts which are 
provided to them and their prior understanding of the context may well affect the individual  
forecasts  they make. For example, Franses (2014, p.86) found that more experienced 
forecasters in a pharmaceutical company produced more accurate adjustments. It might also 
be hoped that their knowledge of forecasting and promotions would lead to improved 
accuracy! 
 
In summary, little is known about the way forecasters use information to produce their 
judgmental adjustments of statistical baseline forecasts. Yet it is an important issue in that 
judgmental adjustment has been shown to improve accuracy quite substantially but 
sometimes also to diminish it, inducing bias and inefficiencies not present in the statistical 
forecasts.  In the remainder of this paper, we test our hypotheses by investigating the 
influences of the following factors on judgmental adjustments to statistical forecasts when a 
special event is imminent and when the different types of information are simultaneously 
available: 
i. The statistical time series evidence, including the statistical time series forecast. 
ii. The effect on sales of an earlier promotion. 
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iii. The number of positive and negative verbal statements relating to the potential 
success of a promotion. 
 
We examine these influences while controlling for prior expectations of promotion effects, 
self-reported knowledge of forecasting and different types of motivation. 
 
3.  Methodology and experimental design 
In order to test the hypotheses developed above, we have adopted a behavioural experimental 
approach, common now in the operations literature (see for example, Gans and Croson 2008, 
Croson  et al. 2012,  Siemsen 2011, Zhao et al 2013). Our experiments were designed to 
replicate the demand forecasting task that is common in supply-chain companies. From these 
summaries of the field of behavioural operations we see that, while experiments are a 
commonly adopted methodology, research into behavioural forecasting issues has been 
relatively rare (estimated as under 4% of behavioural research into operations in Croson et al. 
2012). The advantages of using behavioural experiments here are (as usual) the ability to 
control the various factors hypothesized from the literature review as having possible effects 
on forecasters’ adjustments.  
 
We examine the forecast of the effect of a sales promotion which Fildes and Goodwin (2007) 
identified as the most common reason for forecasters making judgmental adjustment to 
statistical forecasts. From the field case studies we know that the final adjusted forecast 
summarises an often complex S&OP process where various pieces of information are 
gathered by the forecaster and used as a basis to produce the final forecast: the information 
used by the forecasters include market research, promotional features (size, coverage etc.) 
and weather factors (which might damp or amplify, Nikolopoulos et al. 2013).  
 
The participants in the experiments were business and management students, studying for 
either bachelors, masters or doctoral degrees at the same universities as this paper’s authors, 
Bath (UK), Bilkent (Turkey), Lancaster (UK), They had all studied some forecasting. While 
they obviously do not have the same experience as commercial forecasters, they have at least 
as much statistical training as many practicing forecasters.  
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The participants were asked to assume the role of a forecaster for a large company which 
supplies a wide range of products to supermarkets. They were told that their task was to 
predict the sales of a number of these products that would be subject to a sales promotion. 
Each participant was given a brief (see Appendix) describing the task and providing some 
base line information, including the average impact of a promotion at this supermarket. After 
consenting to the terms of the experiment, once started on the experiment proper, information 
potentially relevant was provided which included a statistical baseline forecast together with 
information on the factors that may affect the promotion’s outcome. The information was 
delivered through a forecasting support system (FSS) (see Figure 1 for a typical screenshot). 
The screen has been designed to have features and a format that is similar to those found in 
some widely used commercial forecasting systems (e.g ForecastPro
TM
) including a graphical 
display. This is important as some researchers have found that presenting time series data in a 
tabular, rather than a graphical format can have a strong influence on the accuracy of 
judgmental forecasts (e.g. Harvey and Bolger, 1996). It was hoped that the realism of both 
the system and the participants’ task in interacting with the system would increase the 
ecological validity of our findings including the motivation of the participants (this has been 
the case in other fields such as marketing research involving choice experiments (see e.g. 
Rogers and Soopramanien). 
 
Figure 1 Screenshot of experimental forecasting support system 
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The participants  first saw  product details for a particular SKU, (the SKU’s were  presented 
in random order), a corresponding time series sales  history of 24 periods and the 
corresponding statistical forecast for all periods including the 25th. The data were generated 
according to the rules: 
 
2 0 0 P r
P r ( 4 0 , 6 0 )
(0 , )
t t t
t
S a le s t im e o m o tio n a l E ffe c t
o m o tio n a l E ffe c t U n ifo r m
N o r m a l s td d e v
 

   
  
The time trend parameter took three values: 0 and   1%, while the standard deviation had 
values of 40 and 80. On the rare occasions where the simulated observation turned out 
negative, a value of 0 was substituted. 
 
The FSS provided a simple exponential smoothing forecast (based on a smoothing parameter 
of 0.2) so that the baseline forecast for period t  is given by:    
1 1
0 .2 * S ales 0 .8 *
t t t
B a seL in e F o reca st B a seL in e F o reca st
 
    
For promoted periods, t, the previous baseline forecast is not updated: 
BaseLine Forecastt=BaseLine Forecastt-1 
 
For the period to be forecast (period 25), a random perturbation was added to the forecast. 
This was done by assigning each series a value of 0, or ±50*U(0.4,0.6), i.e., a random 
perturbation of between 20 and 30 in absolute value.  This limited the collinearity between 
the forecast, previous sales observation and previous error, allowing its influence on the 
adjustment to be estimated more precisely.  It was made clear that the baseline forecast did 
not include any promotional effects. 
 
For each SKU, the participants were invited to use their judgment to adjust the baseline 
forecast to take into account the promotion. To inform their judgment they were supplied on 
the screen with several items of information.   First the time series history included the effect 
of an earlier promotion.  The timing and effect of this promotion varied across SKUs but the 
mean sales uplift (relative to the baseline forecast) was 50%. Secondly, each screen carried a 
reminder that the mean (base rate) for promotional uplifts at this supermarket was 50%. 
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Finally, for each SKU the screen displayed between zero and four written statements which 
gave reasons suggesting why the level of sales uplift achieved by the forthcoming 
promotional effect would be above or below the average (‘positive’ and ‘negative’ reasons). 
These reasons related to the amount spent on the promotion  (e.g. “Over £1m is being spent 
on the promotion, double the usual size”), market research (e.g. “Focus groups have been 
quite negative about the promotional packs, but we can’t change these at this late stage.”),  
weather factors (e.g. “This product is mainly sold in the North where the weather conditions 
should be good for high sales according to the latest forecast.”) and campaign effectiveness 
(e.g. “We were hoping for a celebrity endorsement of our product as part of the campaign, 
but negotiations have not been successful and, unfortunately, we will have to run the 
campaign without this endorsement”). A full list of reasons is available from the authors. 
Half of these were positive and half were negative. The number of reasons displayed at any 
one time, the appearance of positive or negative reasons and the order of their display were 
all randomized. 
 
Because of  the complexities of designing a realistic experiment, a number of preliminary 
experiments were run, involving over 200 participants,  to fine tune the design and screen 
display, to eliminate potential confounded factors and to identify the key issues that merited 
further investigation. In the early experiments 24 data series were used, including, 6 trial 
series. In order to lessen the experimental burden the number of series was later  lowered to 
14, including two trial series, and checks confirmed that this had no significant effect on the 
results. Further variations included having a fixed number of four reasons, of which 0 to 4 
were positive, displaying just 2 reasons, colour-coding these reasons (green for positive and 
red for negative), forcing participants to select a primary and secondary reason to support 
their adjustment, having an average promotional uplift of 80%, providing a baseline forecast 
for period 25 without the random perturbation and having treatments that reversed the 
sequence of the reasons provided to another treatment or counterbalanced these reasons by 
displaying  negative reason for each positive and vice versa. In the main, the results of these 
experiments were consistent with those that we discuss next so, for brevity, they will not be 
reported here. We will refer to the few cases where there were differences in the Discussion 
Section 5. 
 
In the final experiment, which we report on in detail here, participants were randomly 
assigned to three treatments that were designed to provide different types of motivation.  The 
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first group were told that they would be rewarded when a  promotion uplift exceeded 50% 
(although this was beyond their control, it was thought that the possibility of  this  reward 
might lead to desirability bias). The second group were told that they would be rewarded for 
the accuracy of their forecasts. A third (control) group were given a reward merely for 
participating in the experiment. This led to a 3 (motivation type) between subjects x 12 
(SKUs) within subjects design.  
 
Before embarking on the experiment, participants were asked to indicate what they thought a 
typical percentage sales uplift would be for a fast-moving consumer good that was being 
promoted.  They then made forecasts for the 2 SKUs that were used as a trial run to 
familiarise themselves with the FSS. For each SKU they had the option of indicating which, 
if any, of the displayed reasons had led them to make their adjustment.  During the trial run 
they were provided with an assessment of why the earlier promotion had, or had not been, a 
success with overall feedback on their accuracy given after forecasts had been made for both 
SKUs. No feedback was provided in the main part of the experiment. The best two 
forecasters in each treatment received an Amazon voucher or in the case of the control group, 
a  prize draw was used to select the two winners. At the end of the experiment participants 
completed a questionnaire designed to assess their knowledge of forecasting, their 
engagement in the task, their expectations regarding the accuracy of their judgmental 
adjustments and their interpretation of the reasons that were provided. 
 
 
4.  Experimental analysis and results 
 
4.1 Exploratory data analysis 
133 participants took part in the experiment. We excluded respondents who did not make any 
but the very smallest average adjustments (i.e. their mean adjustment was less than 0) as this 
suggests either a limited understanding of promotional effects in retailing or no engagement 
with the experiments. The results are therefore based on a sample of 112 participants.  
As indicated above, participants responded to a post-experimental questionnaire. The main 
results of interest are summarised in Table 1. 
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Table 1 Questionnaire responses    
Question 
    Mean 
  
Std.Dev.                                                                                                                 
Rating of overall knowledge of demand forecasting 2.77 0.86 
Expectations of statistical forecast performance 3.03 0.77 
The provided reasons had a direct influence on my 
forecasts 3.46 1.07 
Confidence in my final adjusted forecast 2.66 0.94 
Motivation to engage with the task 3.40 0.98 
    Scale: (1) None / low expectations, to (5) High / high expectations - depending on question  
 
  
The results show participants were generally motivated by the experiment and responded to 
the reasons provided.  Typically, they did not ‘write-off’ the potential performance of the 
statistical baseline forecasts, despite the fact that they were bound to have large errors in a 
promotion period. This may reflect some acknowledgment of the statistical forecasts’ 
usefulness in establishing a reliable baseline for judgmental adjustment. The participants also 
indicated a lack of confidence in the accuracy of their adjusted forecasts which is reasonable 
given the level of uncertainty associated with the promotion effects and the relatively small 
amount of information that was available to support their judgments. 
 
We next look at the change in the estimated uplift from the participant’s prior estimate of 
promotional effects (that would be expected in similar circumstances to those simulated in 
the experiment) to their actual adjustments during the experiment. Table 2 presents 95% 
trimmed means and medians for the participants’ prior estimates, the adjustments they made 
during the experiment and the differences between these two values (the trimming being 
based on the adjustment percentage). 
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Table 2 Prior expectations of uplift and uplift during 
experiment 
  Prior estimate 
Adjustment during 
experiment 
Change in 
estimate 
Mean 50.8% 30.8% -20.0% 
Median 50.0% 30.0% -15.0% 
 
 
The distribution of the percentage adjustment is broadly normal with a few positive outliers. 
25% of the adjustments were greater than the advertised uplift of 50%. Some were as high as 
200%, which is quite reasonable for the sorts of products we have included in our 
experimental design. Overall the results in Table 2 indicate that the participants tended to 
underestimate the promotional effects both with regard to the information provided on 
promotional effects and also the past promotional evidence in the time series. Moreover, they 
provided lower estimates during the experiment, despite the information provided as to the 
typical promotional effects, thereby neglecting the base rate and hence providing support for 
H9.  The possible reason for this will be considered in the Discussion section. 
 
4.2 Statistical modelling 
The nature of the experiment where each respondent is sequentially given a number of series 
in random order requires a more sophisticated analysis than a standard ANOVA or 
regression. We use the following linear mixed-effects  model (Verbeke and Molenberghs, 
2000). 
 (0 , )
(0 , )
i i i i i
i
i i
X Z
N D
N
 

  

Y b
b   
where Yi  is the ni dimensional response vector for respondent i, representing the promotional 
estimates for the ith series. Xi and Zi are the ni x p and ni x q of the factors influencing the 
response while  is the p dimensional vector of fixed treatment effects and bi   is the q 
dimensional vector of random effects. The covariance matrices are potentially important to 
the model building. D and  are assumed independent. A repeated measures design is needed 
as the observations of the promotional uplift estimates from a given subject cannot be 
assumed independent of  each other, for example in the sequence  in which they were made.  
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The standard assumption made for the variance-covariance matrix of the random effects, D,  
is that  the respective variances of the bi   differ but are independent of each other  – labelled 
the variance component assumption. In addition the sensitivity of the estimated effects to 
changes in this assumption has been tested through  an assumed autoregressive structure to 
capture any carry-over effect between the repeated observations,  i.e an AR(1) structure  was 
assumed for D
1
.  
 
The key features of  the  linear mixed effects model are set out below. 
 The dependent variable is the adjustment percentage transformed into log 
(100+Adjust_Percent).  
 The effects of variables relating to the past forecast history were assumed to be 
random effects as they depend on the individual participant. These variables were: the 
log of the respondent’s prior estimates of promotional effects, the log of the last 
forecast error, the log of the uplift achieved in the last promotion (i.e. actual promoted 
sales over the baseline forecast), the log of latest forecast for the promoted period and 
the timing of previous promotion. 
 The effects of the series characteristics, the trend 2and noise variance were treated as 
fixed effects class variables.  
 The number of positive and negative reasons were treated as fixed effects class 
variables, i.e. treatments. 
In addition, the results presented have points of high leverage removed. Leverage was 
measured using Cook’s D (eliminating points with D>.002 – approximating one of the 
recommended cut-offs of 4/n). Various modelling choices needed to be resolved, in particular 
how to characterise the number of negative and positive reasons. Several alternatives were 
considered,  including using both variables (with an interaction) and one variable together 
with the difference between positive and negative reasons. Using the variable Reasncat 
(defined as the number of positive reasons minus the number of negative reasons) proved the 
most parsimonious specification with minimum BIC. A sensitivity check on the assumption 
                                                 
1
 SAS 9.3 has been used in estimating  this model using  Restricted Maximum Likelihood. 
Details of the various defaults used are given in 
http://support.sas.com/documentation/cdl/en/statug/63033/HTML/default/viewer.htm#statug_
mixed_sect007.htm. 
 
2
 The trend was dropped in the results we report as it proved to have little impact on the 
results from the preliminary experiments 
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of the correlation structure of the repeated measures did not show any substantive 
differences. 
 
4.3 Results of modelling 
The results from the model are shown in Table 3.  
Table 3 Model of the percentage adjustment (loge(100+Adjustment%))  
 
Effect Estimate p-value 
Intercept 0.5048 <.0001 
ln(last uplift) 0.2748 <.0001 
ln (last actual) 0.03696 0.0015 
ln (last stats forecast error) 0.03994 0.1051 
ln(current stats forecast) -0.1281 <.0001 
ln(Prior) 0.0347 0.0141 
Noise Variance 0.0214 0.0179 
Timing .0010 0.0357 
Reasncat = -4 -0.1067 <.0001 
Reasncat =-3 -0.1356 <.0001 
Reasncat = -2 -0.1140 <.0001 
Reasncat = -1 -0.0767 <.0001 
Reasncat = 0 -0.0775 <.0001 
Reasncat = 1 -0.0517 0.0014 
Reasncat = 2 -0.0228 0.1120 
Reasncat = 3 -0.0272 0.1004 
 
               [Available n= 1560; sample size after deleting high leverage points=1309] 
               [Reasncat = No. of positive reasons supplied – No. of negative reasons] 
 
 All tests are one-sided apart from that for the noise variance 
 
Effect of time series characteristics and baseline forecast  
The results provide support for H1 (higher sales in the previous promotion will be associated 
with a larger upwards adjustment), H2 (the more recent the previous promotion, the higher 
the adjustment  -though the effect size was relatively small), H3 (the higher the most recent 
sales figure, the higher the adjustment ), H5 (the higher the statistical baseline forecast, the 
smaller the adjustment will be). H4 (larger statistical baseline forecast errors will be 
associated with higher adjustments) was not supported. This may because larger values of the 
most recent observation will be correlated with the most recent forecast error (r = 0.55) so 
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that, rather than amplifying the salience of the most recent observation hypothesis, the most 
recent error was simply seen as a duplicate cue and  was therefore regarded as redundant by 
the participants. H6 (levels of noise in the series will not be associated with the extent of the 
upwards adjustment) was also rejected with the higher observed variation leading to higher 
adjustments.    
 
Effect of Reasons 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between loge(100+Adjustment%) and the difference between 
the number of positive and the number of negative reasons. The effects are compared with 
situations where there are an equal number of positive and negative reasons. Figure 3 shows 
the effect of  marginal increases in the difference  between the number of positive and 
negative reasons. 
Figure 2 Effects on loge(100+Adjustment%) of differences between the number 
of positive and negative reasons relative to situations where there are an equal 
number of positive and negative reasons 
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Figure 3 Incremental effect on loge (100 + adjustment %) of change in number of 
positive minus number of negative reasons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It can be seen that, in general, the greater the number of positive reasons relative to the 
number of negative, the larger the upwards adjustment. This suggests that participants were 
balancing the reasons against each other, indicating that they were using a compensatory 
strategy, which is contrary to H7. However, there is little evidence of  a difference between 
adjustments made when the number of  negative reasons exceeds the number of positives by 
4,3,or 2 (i.e., -4,-3 and -2 in Figure 2). In these cases there is an average reduction in the 
upwards adjustment of 4% compared to the neutral 0 category. This suggests that once the 
number of negative reasons have exceeded the number of positives by 2, any extra negative 
reason will have no effect (we discount the non-monotonic estimate for -3).  This is mirrored 
when the majority of reasons are positive:  an excess of 2, 3 or 4 positive reasons also leads 
to similar sized adjustments (with an average increase of 6% compared to the neutral 
category although four positive reasons leads to a significantly.larger increased adjustment). 
We have tested this out further by considering the contrast between the 0 category and the 
average effect of experiencing positive reasons alone. The effect is approximately 5%  (this is 
significant:, p-value <.0001). 
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Did negative reasons have a greater influence than positive reasons? In part an answer to this 
depends on the mix of reasons available (i.e. a change from the 0 position with 1 positive and 
1 negative reason to a situation where there are 2 positive reasons and 1 negative differs in 
impact compared to the difference between 0 positives, 0 negatives and 1 positive, 0 
negative). The following test illuminates the comparison further by examining the difference 
in the sizes of the logs of the upwards adjustments between having one (two) more positive 
reason versus one (two) more negative. This yields the results in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 Relative effect of extra positive and negative reasons 
Contrast loge(100+Adjustment%)  t Value Pr > |t| 
1 more positive vs 1 more negative reason 0.026 1.87 0.0617 
2 more positive vs 2 more negative reasons 0.018 1.07 0.2834 
 
 
This shows that having one more positive reason is somewhat more impactful than one more 
negative reason (although the p-value is 0.06), but there is little difference between having 2 
more positive compared 2 more negative reasons. Overall, the results suggest that positive 
reasons have slightly more effect than negative ones, which is contrary to H8. 
  
Motivation and participants’ characteristics  
There is an apparent country effect between the participants based in the UK and Turkey 
(p<.001) with the latter providing lower forecasts of uplifts. Once individual priors were 
included the effect was insignificant. This probably reflects the different retail environments 
that the participants were familiar with. There were no other substantive or significant effects 
on the size of the adjustment relating to the different motivation treatments or the 
characteristics of the participants, such as their knowledge of statistical forecasting, apart 
from the finding that participants’ motivation in the task proved significant in increasing their 
average uplift.  Their initial estimates of promotion effects were also significant but the carry-
over effect was small. 
 
Overall, these results suggest that when making their forecasts, participants were aiming to 
match the previous promotion’s sales by adjusting the statistical baseline forecast until it was 
similar to this value. However, this strategy was moderated by the recency of the previous 
promotion, the level of sales achieved in the most recent period, the level of noise in the 
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series and the difference between the number of positive and negative reasons that were 
presented to them. The advertised base rate (i,e. an average uplift of 50%) appeared to have 
been discounted, heavily influenced by experimental information. 
 
5.  Discussion 
In general, the results reported in the last section were consistent with those obtained in the 
preliminary experiments, which were used as part of the experimental design process, 
suggesting that the results are robust. The only noteworthy difference was that the log of the 
previous statistical forecast error had a significant effect on the size of the upwards 
adjustment in the preliminary experiments, but in the main experiment the effect was not 
significant. In the preliminary experiments the forecasts were obtained though exponential 
smoothing so a positive error in the most recent period would be followed by a higher 
baseline forecast for the forthcoming period. Thus a large positive error would be likely to 
amplify the effect of  a higher forecast  as it enhanced the  impression that the baseline had 
increased. In the main experiment the random perturbations that were applied to the statistical 
baseline forecast may have nullified this potential amplification. For example, a positive error 
could be followed by a forecast that was lower than its predecessor.  
 
Three findings are of particular interest. The first is the large range of information that 
participants drew upon to make their forecast adjustments. Almost all the cues available to 
them had a significant effect on the size of the adjustments despite the large amount of 
information presented and the mix of quantitative (’hard’) and verbal (’soft’) information. 
Surprisingly, despite the volume of information presented and the number of SKUs they had 
to produce forecasts for, they appeared to apply a compensatory strategy when using the 
reasons to assess the required adjustment. 
 
In many cases the cues were used inappropriately. For example, the timing of the last 
promotion should have had no influence on the judgments and the optimal estimate of  
promotional uplift  was not related to  the time series history.   In particular, the most recent 
observation was found to carry undue influence, thereby replicating the findings of time 
series extrapolation studies where no special events  are present. Moreover, the participants’ 
attempts to match a single past observation (i.e. the sales achieved by the previous 
promotion)  ignored the lack of diagnosticity that is inherent in a single case - using the 
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advertised base rate of 50% uplift as a starting point would have  been a superior strategy. 
Anyway, the sales achieved in the previous promotion were less relevant than the extent to 
which these sales exceeded the statistical baseline forecasts for that period. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that the use of a wide range of information was made possible through the use of a 
forecasting support system which enabled all the information to be presented simultaneously 
on single screen. It is possible that this information-rich presentation enabled the participants 
to adopt a simple cumulative additive strategy : starting with the   previous promotion’s sales, 
an upward or downward adjustment could be made from the current estimate as each new cue 
was examined. Only the estimate based on the cues examined so far and the effect of the new 
cue would need to be considered at any stage during the process. 
 
The second interesting finding is that, despite the wide range of information employed by the 
participants, there was a consistent bias towards under estimating the effect of the 
forthcoming promotions (this was also a consistent finding in all of the preliminary 
experiments).  The bias occurred despite the fact that the 50% average uplift was highlighted 
both in the cover story and in information presented on the computer screen during the trial 
run. Telling participants that they would be rewarded if the uplift exceed 50% (in an attempt 
to induce desirability bias) had no effect, nor did rewarding accuracy. 
 
We considered four  possible reasons for this: (i) the participants were conservative in that 
their prior expectations of typical uplifts caused them to discount the provided information on 
the base-rate for promotions, (ii)  the negative reasons carried more weight than the positive 
reasons,  (iii) the participants regarded the advertised average uplift as a best-case scenario 
that only applied when positive reasons were provided or (iv) the previous promotion effect 
and the statistical forecast both acted as anchors so the estimated uplift tended to be set at a 
point between them. The first explanation seems implausible, given the results in Table 1, 
where it can be seen that the average adjustments made during the experiments were actually 
substantially lower than the prior estimates. While participants’ prior estimates were 
significantly associated with the ones made during the experiment the carry-over effect was 
low (and insignificant in the preliminary experiments). Regarding the second explanation, as 
indicated earlier, there was no evidence that negative reasons carried greater weight.  In fact 
there was a slight tendency for positive reasons to have more impact on the adjustments. The 
third explanation is also not supported:  the mean adjustment in cases where there were no 
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negative reasons were supplied was only 30.8%. Even when there were 4 positive reasons is 
was only 43.9%, still short of the base-rate.   
 
In relation to the fourth explanation,  Hoch and Schkade (1996) found that, when people 
adopted a pattern matching strategy, the point they were trying to match acted as the anchor 
with (insufficient) adjustments being made based on the conditions that applied to the case 
being forecast. Given that the task required an adjustment to the statistical forecast this could 
have acted as a second anchor. Anderson’s (1965)  integration model suggests that anchoring 
and adjustment can be  modelled as a weighted average of a starting or initial value (i.e. an 
anchor, in this case the statistical baseline forecast), and an estimate that the person would 
have made had they not seen the anchor (in this case the sales in the previous promotion). 
This would tend to place the estimated uplift below the 50% base rate, as was observed.  
Thus this explanation appears to be the most plausible. 
 
Is the underestimation of promotion effects we found in our laboratory experiments typical of 
what happens in the field?  Several field studies have reported that judgmental adjustments 
tend to suffer from a optimism bias (Fildes et. al. 2009, Franses and Legerstee 2011), the 
opposite to what we have found here. However, neither of these studies confined their 
analysis to specifically forecast periods when a special event was due to occur. Moreover, a 
study of the sales forecasts of German companies, again not limited to special periods and not 
limited to adjustments of statistical forecasts, found a pessimism bias (Muller 2011). It  was 
argued that because these forecasts were made anonymously to a panel there was no 
incentive to ‘overgloss’ the forecasts and  instead the forecasts were the result of loss 
aversion where a negative surprise was disliked more than positive ones were liked.  One 
study that focused on promotion periods did find an optimism bias, but in the manufacturing 
company studied, the sales in promotion periods were on average only 8.7% higher than 
those of the statistical baseline forecast (Trapero et al. 2013). It is unclear whether over-
optimism would still have been evident if the typical uplift had been as high as 50%, as in our 
experiment. 
 
The third interesting finding is that a larger average upwards adjustment was made by those 
who chose to indicate which reason had the greatest influence on their adjustment (the 
median adjustments were 30% compared to 25%.) For those participants who also included 
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the SKU characteristics as one of their reasons behind their adjustments, predicted 
adjustments were 30% compared to 20%. This suggests that a lower uplift is predicted when 
neither the reasons nor the SKU characteristics resonate, a sensible strategy though it ignores 
the base rate of 50%.   Table 4 gives the overall median uplifts where at least one positive 
reason was selected as a reason for the uplift compared to a negative reason and where no 
reasons were selected. Interestingly, the largest adjustments tended to  be made  when both 
positive and negative reasons were selected. It is unclear why this was the case. It might have 
reflected greater engagement with the task  so that  greater attention was paid to the base-rate; 
or alternatively, the heavier cognitive load of attempting to consider both types of reasons 
may in some way have led to larger adjustments.  Typically with more positive (negative) 
reasons available participants were more likely to select a positive (negative) reason. This has 
implications for  how information is captured in the S&OP process and the design of the FSS. 
 
Table 4 The effects of selecting a positive (negative) reason on the predicted uplift. The 
number of times the particular cell was selected is shown in brackets. 
Available 
reasons 
Selected  
 Positive 
selected 
Negative 
selected 
Both positive and 
negative selected 
None selected 
More positive 18.5 (46) 8 (10) 49 (30) 4 (15) 
More Negative 15.5 (20) 14.5 (42) 34.5 (44) 30 (30) 
No difference  21.5 (34) 18 (27) 41 (32) 30 (307) 
Only positive 42 (241) n.r. n.r 12 (85) 
Only Negative n.r 25 (213) n.r. 23 (120) 
Overall  37 (341) 24 (292) 40 (106) 25 (557) 
 
The analysis using the mixed model can also illuminate the effects of selection. Where there 
are more positive than negative reasons available and a positive one is selected, there is a 
higher (significant) uplift than the case where no reason is identified. 
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Finally, none of our motivation treatments had a significant effect on the size of adjustments. 
While these were not the main focus of the study –they were intended to control for possible 
motivational effects - the absence of a desirability bias for those who were rewarded for 
higher than average uplifts was surprising. This once again demonstrates that it is difficult to 
replicate motivational and associated political effects that occur in the field in the laboratory. 
A small reward of a voucher for a higher sales forecast or an accurate one is not the same as 
the incentive to please the boss with a high forecast or the incentive to bring kudos and 
resources to one’s department by producing reliable forecasts. In particular, in the field there 
may be  a sense of personal responsibility for the success of a promotion leading to wishful 
thinking and  advocacy bias (i.e. ‘the tendency of product planners to champion their project 
by overpromising on forecasts’ (Tyebjee 1987)), and there could also be prestige-related 
motivations leading to various distortions and biases 
 
6.   Conclusions 
Information from actors engaged in supply chain planning is potentially crucial to effective 
demand forecasting. In the S&OP process, information is exchanged between production, 
logistics, finance, sales, marketing and the demand planners in attempts to reconcile demand 
with supply availability. Given their supply chain and financial repercussions, promotions 
pose particularly sharp challenges to S&OP decision-makers. This experimental study has 
examined how forecasts of  the effects of promotional events are produced using a 
forecasting support system that closely replicates those observed in practice. The results 
match those seen in the field with various heuristics being adopted by the forecasters. In 
particular, past observations on the SKUs  (Fildes et al. 2009) as well as the exemplar 
previous promotions (Cooper et al. 1999)  are used by participants despite leading to 
inefficiencies; that is to say, reweighting these pieces of information could potentially lead to 
more accurate forecasts of uplift. A critical element in the S&OP process is how external 
sources of information (provided through either face-to-face meetings or,  as is becoming 
more mainstream,  electronically (Weller and Crone 2102), as in this study) are used to 
improve on a baseline statistical forecast. The experimental evidence reported in this work 
showed that participants took into account the positive (and negative) pieces of information 
using a compensatory strategy, though at the extremes, additional pieces of positive or 
negative information had less impact. Furthermore, participants also appeared to take  into 
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account extraneous information damaging to forecast accuracy. The validity of the results 
from the experiment presented in detail here is demonstrated by their robustness over the two 
earlier experiments where information was supplied in a somewhat different form and with 
different sized promotional effect.  
 
The research has important implications for the design of forecasting support systems and 
also the S&OP process itself. The participants (and from the field evidence, practicing 
forecasters) mis-interpret the time series history: they choose not to accept the accuracy of 
the statistical baseline forecast, using this and past observations to reweight the forecast, 
introducing additional forecast error and displaying a case of ‘algorithm aversion’ (Dietvorst 
et al.,2015). They also appear to adopt a version of the ‘last-lift’ heuristic, the most common 
promotional forecasting method used in practice. Their mistake is to ignore the average 
uplift, instead focussing on the last observed value. It may be thought that a possible 
explanation for this lies in the experimental subjects trying to outguess the experimenters, but 
what we have observed reflects what has already been seen in the field. Both facets of the 
participants sub-optimal forecasting suggest that FSSs need to be redesigned: the baseline 
forecasting algorithm would need to be carefully constructed and in particular, evidence as to 
its effectiveness provided;  though, as Dietvorst et al. (2015) and Lim and O’Connor (1995) 
have shown, changing the habit of misweighting remains difficult. Second, evidence on 
promotional effects needs to be presented in a form that remains salient but overrides the 
randomness of a particular past promotion, perhaps following some of Lee et al.’s (2007) 
suggestions. 
 
Like most experimental studies, this work has limitations in its use of students, despite their 
motivation and knowledge which closes some of the gap with practicing forecasters. In 
addition, while the on-screen simulation mirrored the operational realities of forecasting 
closely, the demand model and the promotional effects were based on a simple statistical 
model. It is both of theoretical interest and practical significance to move one step closer to 
practice with a demand model that captures some promotional drivers: the issue confronting 
experimental participants and forecasters then  becomes whether a forecaster facing the 
diversity of information that the S&OP process delivers through a real FSS (such as SAP-
APO) can see the wood for the many trees. With the limitations of current systems (Fildes et 
al. 2006),  it seems there is substantial scope for design innovations. 
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